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Abstract     This article examines the undemocratic process of telecommunications divestment in Jamaica and Trin-
idad and Tobago. The divestment of the telecommunications sector was largely prompted by each state’s inability to 
service external debt. Despite espousing the importance of public participation in the ownership of state-owned en-
terprises being divested, the governments each limited or excluded nationals from ownership of the telephony com-
panies. Divestment of the telecommunications sector was principally undertaken through private negotiations with 
Cable and Wireless which has historically provided service to former British colonies. This continued colonization 
of the telecommunications sector is at odds with the democratic structure of both states. 
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This article examines the process of telecommu-
nications divestment and its effects on the demo-
cratic process with distinct reference to Jamaica 
and Trinidad and Tobago. The article initially 
explores various factors prompting divestment of 
state-owned enterprises, specifically analyzing 
the telecommunications sector. It then examines 
the process of telecommunications divestment in 
Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. 
A SIMILAR SYSTEMS COMPARATIVE 
DESIGN 
The two island states of the Caribbean were cho-
sen for a comparative case study, a frequently 
used policy research method which examines the 
process by which an intervention or policy action 
has been implemented, since the two countries 
possess some notable similarities. This case-
oriented comparative research strategy is based 
on the premise advocated by Przeworski and 
Teune (1982) that systems as similar as possible 
with respect to as many characteristics as possi-
ble comprise the optimal choices for comparative 
inquiry. A similar systems design is a ‘maximum’ 
strategy for the number of experimental variables, 
in this case between the two Caribbean states 
chosen for this study, which, while still large, 
have been minimized. 
With respective populations less than 5 mil-
lion, the two small island countries bear many 
common cultural attributes and each boasts a rel-
atively high physical quality of life index. The 
two countries also fit a similar economic typolo-
gy, that is, they may both be classified as small, 
open economies which also may be described as 
mineral economies, given that bauxite in Jamaica 
and oil in Trinidad and Tobago have constituted, 
at various times, at least 40 percent of each coun-
try’s exports. Further, as former British colonies 
which both received their independence in 1962, 
the countries inherited legal systems which owe 
their basic concepts to English common law and 
adopted the same political regime type, the 
Westminster system of parliamentary govern-
ment with a prime minister as head of govern-
ment. Jamaica, like most independent countries 
of the Commonwealth Caribbean, retains the 
British monarch as the titular head of state repre-
sented by a local governor general, whereas Trin-
idad and Tobago, akin to Guyana, adopted a re-
publican status with a president as head of state. 
Despite the democratic nature of these states, the 
governments of both Jamaica and Trinidad and 
Tobago limited or excluded the citizens from 
participating in the ownership of public or state-
owned enterprises in the process of divestment, 
as exemplified in the telecommunications sector. 
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DEMOCRACY 
The nature of a democracy is to promote the pro-
cess of participation in decisions that affect the 
lives of the citizenry and the social goal of mov-
ing toward equality. A participatory democracy 
is not confined to casting a vote in periodic local 
and national elections, which is often little more 
than a symbolic gesture of democracy, but, as 
Mosco (1989) writes, aims at creating economic 
and sociocultural participation and equity. A cen-
tral feature of a democracy is its public character, 
which thus includes public participation in the 
economy, as in the divestment or denationaliza-
tion of state-owned enterprises. 
FACTORS PROMPTING DIVESTMENT 
The divestment of state-owned enterprises, in-
cluding telephony companies, has become an in-
creasingly utilized tool of economic reform in 
developing countries. Structural adjustment pro-
grams prescribed by the World Bank have regu-
larly sought institutional reform of state-owned 
enterprises due to their weak economic perfor-
mance. Hemming and Mansoor (1987) note that 
the inefficiency of the public sector is generally 
associated with bureaucratic failure and political 
interference. The public enterprise is often em-
ployed as an instrument for political patronage in 
many developing countries. It is thus thought that 
privatization, by reducing political interference, 
will improve a firm’s efficiency. This rationale 
stems from the property rights school which con-
tends that a change to private ownership will im-
prove the incentives for productive efficiency 
performance. Management, as opposed to owner-
ship, is arguably, however, the key to efficiency. 
Although the long-term goal of privatization may 
be economic efficiency, Suleiman and Waterbury 
(1990) recognize that the short-term stimulus has 
often been deficit reduction. The acquisition of 
foreign exchange has not, however, generally 
been publicly declared as an objective of divest-
ment. Rather, privatization is touted as a means 
to improve the management of state enterprises, 
thus making the transaction more politically pal-
atable. 
The shortage of foreign exchange has none-
theless been a compelling motive for many pri-
vatization programs, as many developing coun-
tries face a limited choice between foreign equity 
investment and foreign debt. To scale back the 
burgeoning state sector by divesting saleable 
public assets to the private sector has been con-
sidered by some governments as a means of han-
dling an acute capital shortage and acquiring 
funds for debt servicing or capital investments. 
For countries whose deficits and debts have 
grown beyond control and cannot be reversed by 
a continuation of the policy of state ownership, 
divestiture has become viewed as a means to 
raise revenue and reduce fiscal and credit pres-
sures. 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS DIVESTMENT 
In regard to the telecommunications sector, many 
governments of developing countries are caught 
in the quagmire of upgrading an antiquated tele-
communications system with modern equipment 
at a capital cost beyond their means. It is thought 
that private investors with access to commercial 
lending sources and expanded credit possibilities 
will be better able to provide the capital neces-
sary for the development of the telecommunica-
tions infrastructure and the provision of diverse 
services. Partners are also sought for their tech-
nological and management capabilities. Govern-
ments typically seek partners with considerable 
experience in building and operating telecommu-
nications networks. The divestment of the tele-
communications sector is thus more likely to in-
volve the sale of the enterprise as a complete en-
tity, or, at least, controlling interest is sold to a 
foreign telecommunications service provider. 
The factors affecting the decision to privatize the 
telecommunications sector may vary, but one 
aspect of the outcome is virtually universal: the 
participation of a foreign investor. 
This arrangement limits the ability of the 
public, the nationals, to participate in the owner-
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ship of the firm. Public share offerings, in broad-
ening the structure of private ownership, assist in 
democratizing the process of divestment. Em-
ployee share schemes, though exercised, are of-
ten only employed so as to diffuse opposition to 
privatization. Since public share offerings are 
generally constrained in developing countries by 
the thinness of capital markets and the embryonic 
stature of the stock exchanges, Howard (1992) 
contends that additional efforts must be made to 
increase market capacity to handle the float. A 
stock market offering directed to the small inves-
tor can assist in redistributing wealth in a com-
munity through broad-based share ownership. 
Vickers and Yarrow (1991) recognize those 
policies associated with promoting wider share 
ownership, including pricing at substantial dis-
counts to market values, together with measures 
like share allocation rules that favour small in-
vestors, and inducements for them to hold on to 
their shares rather than sell out at a quick profit. 
If small shareholders sell their shares within the 
first year or so, a concentrated shareholding may 
develop. As Cowan (1990) cautions, the number 
of shares any one individual may acquire must be 
limited to curtail the concentration of ownership 
of shares by the wealthy elites, and create a con-
stituency for privatization as well as a ready 
market for the nexL offering. The adroit use of 
the mass media to explain stockholding, share 
purchase and the potential uses of future divi-
dend payments can be employed to create popu-
lar support. Public favor of privatization as well 
as broad-based share ownership can also be 
achieved through the distribution of shares free 
of charge, either directly or in the form of vouch-
ers that are redeemable for shares in former state-
owned enterprises. 
THE PROCESS OF DIVESTMENT IN JA-
MAICA AND TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 
This people’s capitalism, a process of democrati-
zation, was espoused by political parties in both 
Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. The National 
Alliance for Reconstruction (NAR, 1986) in 
Trinidad and Tobago stated in their election man-
ifesto that shares in state enterprises to be divest-
ed would be offered to workers and their affiliat-
ed unions and to local capital. The Jamaican La-
bour Party (JLP) under Prime Minister Edward 
Seaga, too, advocated opportunities for the wid-
est possible share ownership which were to be 
facilitated through the stock exchange. The poli-
cies of both the NAR and JLP also emphasized 
deregulation. The ideological position of the par-
ties conceptualized development in an economy 
in which the private sector was seen as the en-
gine of growth. As Mills (1989) notes, the ap-
propriate role for the public sector was deemed 
as providing the infrastructural framework to fa-
cilitate the efficienl operation of the private sec-
tor. This position was also assumed by the Peo-
ple’s National Party (PNP) in Jamaica, which 
upon returning to power in 1989 under the prime 
ministership of Michael Manley who had been 
routed from power in 1980 by the JLP, intensi-
fied the privatization policies and market-
oriented economic strategies adopted by the op-
position. Indeed, as Stone (1992) writes, the pol-
icy of divestment represents one of the core areas 
of continuity in policy making between the JLP 
and PNP in the 1980s and 1990s. Broadening the 
base of ownership in the economy, however, was 
not retained as a priority in either Jamaica or 
Trinidad and Tobago, as evident in the sale of 
shares in the state-owned telephone companies in 
the two countries. 
Both Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago stipu-
lated in a ‘Letter of Intent’ to the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) the divestment of the 
state-owned telephone company. To qualify for 
IMF assistance, a borrowing country must agree 
to implement policy measures set out in these 
letters. Although the privatization of state enter-
prises has been stipulated in lending conditionali-
ties by various external agencies, individual 
companies or sectors are not specified. The deci-
sion concerning which firms to divest and the 
method of divestment rests with the government. 
Telecommunications of Jamaica 
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The telecommunications sector was originally 
chosen for divestment, in the case of Jamaica, in 
an attempt to yield funds for the electoral cam-
paign of the reigning administration of the JLP. 
The impending national elections required that 
Seaga increase public expenditures, particularly 
in the areas of roads, health and education. Di-
vestment was employed as a measure to cope 
with the budget deficit in an situation where an 
increase in expenditure on social services was 
deemed indispensable for the government’s polit-
ical survival. Jamaica’s system of patronage poli-
tics thus explains, in large part, the JLP’s deci-
sion to divest the telecommunications sector and 
the timing of this decision. Indeed, as Stephens 
and Stephens (1989) note, in the Budget debate 
in the House in May 1988, the year preceding 
general elections, Seaga projected that a total of 
J$430 million was to come from divestment in 
that fiscal year, including J$100 million from 
Telecommunications of Jamaica. 
The JLP also regarded telecommunications as 
a key to encouraging foreign investment and cre-
ating a competitive exporting sector linked to the 
US economy, and viewed privatization as a 
means to upgrade the system by accessing tech-
nology, finance and foreign exchange. Arguably, 
this view was simply politically astute and a 
post-rationalization of the divestment. Regardless 
of the validity of this argumentation, limited do-
mestic and foreign capital did curtail expansion 
of the telecommunications infrastructure for the 
government was restricted in its ability to guar-
antee funds for capital improvements. Both the 
Jamaica Telephone Company (JTC), the domes-
tic telecommunications firm which offered local 
or basic telephony service, and Jamaica Interna-
tional Telecommunications (JAMINTEL), the 
international carrier, were incorporated into the 
government’s budgeting under IMF credit ceil-
ings for state-owned enterprises. Hence, as Adam 
et al. (1992) write, the telephony companies 
found their capital expenditure plans subject to 
vetoes based on quarterly macroeconomic targets 
rather than long-term, firm-level planning. The 
situation was particularly acute for JTC, since 
restricted expansion of the infrastructure meant 
that its penetration rate was contained at a low 
level. It was thus recommended by Mayer Mata-
lon, then chairperson of JTC and deputy chair-
person of JAMINTEL, that a holding company 
for the two firms be created to facilitate privati-
zation. 
In early 1987, the government of Jamaica 
proposed a merger of JTC and JAMINTEL with 
Cable and Wireless Limited (C&W). C&W was 
interested in partaking in the holding company as 
it held a 49 percent shareholding in JAMINTEL 
and its license was to expire in three years.1 Mat-
alon, an ambassador at large traveling under the 
same visa as a prime minister, handled these ne-
gotiations which were carried out in London in 
February 1987. It was agreed that a holding 
company, Telecommunications of Jamaica Lim-
ited (TOJ), be formed to assume the sharehold-
ings of both JAMINTEL and JTC. C&W and the 
Jamaican government further agreed to procure 
an eventual merger or amalgamation of JTC and 
JAMINTEL, which was finally secured via the 
Telecommunications of Jamaica (Transfer to and 
Vesting of Assets and Liabilities of Jamaica Tel-
ephone Company Limited and Jamaica Interna-
tional Telecommunications Limited) Act, 1995. 
The actual merger was completed 1 April 1995. 
It was also agreed that Matalon would serve as 
the chairperson of TOJ which acquired control-
ling interest in JAMINTEL on 19 May 1987 and 
in JTC on 23 July 1987. According to the Ac-
countant General (1988), both JAMINTEL and 
JTC were wholly owned subsidiaries of TOJ 
which became a public company on 1 July 1987. 
Although C&W, on account of its shares in 
JAMINTEL, initially held only 9 percent of the 
holding company, it was agreed, as reported by 
Telecommunications of Jamaica (1990), that 
C&W would be permitted to acquire additional 
shares from the Jamaican government to enable 
the company to own 20 percent of the company. 
According to the former president of TOJ, C. 
Chantrielle (pers. comm., 22 September 1993), 
C&W was allowed to increase its shareholding to 
20 percent as the company could not otherwise 
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reflect its investment in TOJ in its balance sheets 
due to stipulations in its own corporate act. 
While it has been contended that 80 percent of 
TOJ was to be owned by Jamaicans or Jamaican 
interests (‘Move to Merge’, 1989), in October 
1987, according to the Accountant General 
(1988), C&W acquired a further 19 percent of 
the issued share capital of TOJ, giving the firm a 
39 percent interest in TOJ. The JLP sold the 
shares to acquire funds for the international net 
reserves. 
The next year, in September 1988, the JLP 
made a public offering of shares by placing 13 
percent of the government’s shares for sale on 
the Jamaica stock exchange. According to R. 
Downer (pers. comm., 14 September 1993) of 
Price Waterhouse, the amount of shares was lim-
ited so as not to flood the market. The Account-
ant General offered 126.5 million ordinary shares 
of J$1.00 each to the public at J$0.88 per share. 
Applications for the shares, which had to be paid 
in full on application, could only be made by Ja-
maican residents or bodies corporate, incorpo-
rated or registered in Jamaica and controlled by 
Jamaican citizens. Although there was no limit to 
the maximum number of shares for which an ap-
plicant could apply, applications had to be made 
for a minimum of 200 shares. In making the pub-
lic share offering, the Seaga administration re-
putedly sought a broader based share ownership 
in TOJ, yet the minimal share specification is at 
odds with the JLP objective of wide share own-
ership, for the majority of the citizens could ill 
afford this number of shares. The exception to 
this stipulation was the employee share scheme. 
The Accountant General (1988) reports that 
of the shares placed on the stock market, about 2 
percent were reserved under an employee share 
scheme. The National Workers Union (NWU), 
which has represented the staff union of JA-
MINTEL since its inception in 1971 and that of 
the JTC for the past few decades, negotiated the 
employee share scheme. According to the presi-
dent of the NWU, C. Dobson (pers. comm., 30 
September 1993), there was not enough capital to 
demand more than 2 percent of the shares. Em-
ployee share offerings have been used in various 
countries, such as Mexico, as a way to include 
workers in the economic participation of the new 
firm and to counter their opposition to the privat-
ization. 
Following the offering on the Jamaican stock 
exchange, the public held 19 percent of the 
shares. Spike (1992) writes that nearly 15,000 
investors, of a resident population of some 2.5 
million, applied for the shares offered on the 
stock exchange, raising, as Scaga had projected, 
nearly J$120 million in the process. The gov-
ernment of Jamaica and C&W reflected a mir-
rored shareholding profile with 40 percent and 39 
percent respectively. It was not the intention of 
the JLP, as written in the prospectus, to reduce 
the government’s shareholding below 40 percent. 
The PNP, however, in June 1989, privately 
negotiated an additional sale of 20 percent of the 
government’s shares to C&W. C&W thus be-
came the majority shareholder with 59 percent of 
the shares. Then, in November 1990, the Manley 
administration sold its remaining shares in TOJ, 
20 percent, to C&W. The British corporation’s 
shareholding, thus, stood, as it remains to date, at 
79 percent. 
There was a great deal of public criticism of 
these arrangements. Indeed, it would have been 
politically sensitive to democratize the divest-
ment process through a public share offering or, 
at the very least, by making the additional shares 
available to existing shareholders. Nonetheless, 
the PNP excused its actions by stating that it 
found it necessary to dispose of its remaining 
shares in order to secure foreign exchange to 
support the foreign exchange requirements of the 
Jamaican economy. 
Jamaica’s foreign debt had steadily increased 
during the 1980s. According to Ramsaran (1992), 
in 1980 it amounted to US$1.9 billion or 57 per-
cent of GNP. By 1989, the World Bank (1992) 
calculated that the total debt stocks had grown to 
US$4.5 billion or 129 percent of GDP, making it 
one of the world’s most severely indebted coun-
tries on a per capita basis. McAfee (1991) notes 
that Seaga borrowed more during his first two 
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years in office than previous administrations had 
borrowed in the entire preceding decade. Despite 
the fact that US assistance, which had dropped to 
US$2.6 million in 1979, Manley’s last year in 
office, had increased to US$69.5 million in 1982 
(‘US/Caribbean’, 1982), making Jamaica one of 
the fifth highest per capita recipients of US aid, 
Seaga amassed an unmanageable debt. Debt ser-
vicing, which, arguably, receives higher priority 
than the expansion of the capital base, has proven 
problematic for Jamaica and has resulted in the 
suspension of successive IMF agreements as the 
government fails to adhere to IMF conditionali-
ties and pass performance tests. 
In order to have a standby agreement with the 
IMF reinstated in 1991, Manley agreed to meet 
various IMF targets, including the clearing of 
debt arrears to official and private creditors. It 
was in Manley’s attempts to secure the requisite 
foreign exchange to meet IMF targets that the 
shares were sold to C&W. The additional TOJ 
sales were not part of a broader philosophy re-
garding the sector. Furthermore, as the minister 
responsible for Public Utilities, R. Pickersgill 
(pers. comm., 28 September 1993) notes, the 
timetable to meet the IMF targets was too tight to 
permit the process of public share offerings. The 
sales of shares are thus indicative of a crisis 
management approach to government. The PNP 
expended political capital in its haste to obtain 
foreign exchange. At this time, the Jamaica stock 
exchange, too, took issue with a clause in the 
prospectus, which it had not approved, that indi-
cated the government’s intention to not further 
reduce its shareholding. 
C&W was, moreover, not particularly inter-
ested in purchasing the last 20 percent of the 
government’s shares since the company was al-
ready the majority shareholder. Matalon, who, 
sources reveal, holds close personal ties with 
both Manley and senior officers in C&W, per-
suaded C&W to purchase the additional shares. 
Matalon arranged the sale to C&W with the un-
derstanding that the archaic 1893 Telephone Act 
would be rewritten to reflect new technological 
developments and the powers of the license 
would be widened. According to various sources, 
including the attorney for TOJ, T. Patterson (pers. 
comm., 17 September 1993), Manley wrote a 
personal letter promising these arrangements. 
Although C&W would have preferred to wait 
until the legislation was passed before actually 
buying the shares, the IMF targets were too near 
and the foreign exchange was needed immediate-
ly by the Jamaican government, so the company 
agreed to comply. The PNP sold each 20 percent 
block of shares to C&W for US$42 million, a 
price comparable to that paid by C&W for 49 
percent of the telephony system in Trinidad and 
Tobago. 
Telecommunications Services of Trinidad and 
Tobago 
The process of divestment and the resultant 
shareholding structure in Trinidad and Tobago 
differs from that of Jamaica in several notable 
respects, including the absence of a public share 
offering and employee share scheme. The rea-
sons for the actual sale of shares are analogous, 
however, in that the government was in need of 
foreign exchange to service external debt obliga-
tions and build the international net reserves. The 
inclusion of a foreign partner in the telecommu-
nications sector was not actually part of a broad-
er reform strategy, though the situation may thus 
be post-rationalized, as former chair of the te-
lephony company board, K. Hudson-Philips (pers. 
comm., 5 November 1993) notes. 
The structure of the telecommunications sec-
tor in Trinidad and Tobago parallels that of Ja-
maica. TELCO, the Trinidad and Tobago Tele-
phone Company, corresponds to JTC as 
TEXTEL, the Trinidad and Tobago External Tel-
ecommunications Company, corresponds to JA-
MINTEL. Also, as in JAMINTEL, C&W held 49 
percent of TEXTEL and its license was soon to 
expire. This accounts, in part, for its ownership 
presence in Telecommunications Services of 
Trinidad and Tobago (TSTT), which was created 
soon after the divestment of TELCO with the 
merger of TELCO and TEXTEL. 
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Unlike Jamaica, however, the domestic carri-
er in Trinidad and Tobago had undertaken a mas-
sive network expansion and development pro-
gram which spanned 1981 -6. The expansion was 
based on general economic growth and accom-
panying growth in the customer rate base. TEL-
CO’s investment was geared toward a much 
higher level of economic activity in the country. 
TELCO financed the entire costly program with 
loans, much of them commercial, for the gov-
ernment had authorized the company to borrow 
money commercially in 1981. According to 
TSTT (1991), the bulk of the financing for the 
development program was secured through the 
Bank of Commerce in Canada, the Export De-
velopment Corporation, also of Canada, the Ex-
port-Import or EXIM Bank of the USA and a 
Japanese consortium led by Sumitomo Bank. 
TELCO procured a government-guaranteed debt 
of several million US dollars. Its debt stood at 
TT$981,125 million in 1986 when the exchange 
rate was TT$2.40 to US$1.00, reports Pannell 
Kerr Forster Chartered Accountants (1987). In 
1986 its medium and long-term borrowings rep-
resented more than 70 percent of total assets, and 
this figure excludes short-term local financing 
(TELCO, 1988a). 
The decline of the Trinidadian economy had, 
moreover, reached crisis proportions by this time. 
The unraveling of the economy in the 1980s is 
largely attributed to decreased oil earnings due to 
the depressed state of the international oil market 
since 1982, an exogenous factor, and declining 
oil production. The government, that is, the Peo-
ple’s National Movement (PNM) under Eric Wil-
liams (Prime Minister, 1962-81) and George 
Chambers (Prime Minister, 1981-6) also mis-
managed the petroleum export-led economy dur-
ing the economic upswing. The PNM failed to 
mobilize its oil revenue to diversify and increase 
the internal dynamics of other sectors of the 
economy. It also failed to curb expenditures dur-
ing the boom period and prepare for adverse 
price and production changes. 
Although TELCO began to scale down its in-
vestment program with the downturn in the Trin-
idadian economy and thus did not utilize all of 
the external loans, the company still found itself 
unable to service its debt which was among the 
highest of the country’s state enterprises. Unfor-
tunately, while most of the infrastructure of 
TELCO’s development program was laid by 
1986, resulting in a marked improvement in cost-
efficiency and quality of service, the company 
was in poor economic health. It faced high debt-
servicing costs at a time when the economy suf-
fered severe contraction and Chambers had is-
sued a directive that state enterprises were to be 
self-financing. Further, currency devaluations 
had the effect of increasing the company’s debt-
servicing obligations on foreign borrowings. De-
spite approved rate increases by the Public Utili-
ties Commission in 1983 and 1985 of 100 per-
cent and 20 percent respectively, the company 
was crippled by the devaluations. The debt, 
which had to be paid in hard currency, grew un-
manageable. The coalition government of the 
NAB, which had won the elections of 1986, 
therefore sought a means to refinance TELCO. 
In September 1987, TELCO appointed Mor-
gan Grenfell and Co. to serve as financial and 
technical advisors and assist in implementing a 
restructuring program which included the intro-
duction of a private equity investor to subscribe 
to an issue of new shares, the rescheduling of the 
company’s loans and a merger with TEXTEL. 
Morgan Grenfell arranged for international ad-
vertising for a firm to subscribe to 49 percent of 
the total issued share capital. Following receipt 
of the ‘Information Memorandum’ dated Febru-
ary 1988, several firms indicated interest in the 
shares (TELCO, 1988c). One attraction of TEL-
CO for foreign investors was that the company 
received a large loss provision for tax purposes. 
Four companies, Atlantic Tele Network Inc. 
(ATN), British Telecom (BT), C&W and Tele-
fonica of Spain, submitted offers (TELCO, 
1988b). While this open bidding process may be 
considered democratic for the foreign corpora-
tions, it utterly ignored the internal dynamics of 
democracy by excluding public participation. 
This undemocratic practice was also contrary to 
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the NAR election manifesto, which was adopted 
as a policy document by the Cabinet, and, as not-
ed, stated that shares in state enterprises to be 
divested would be offered to workers and their 
affiliated unions and to local capital. 
Only two offers, those of BT and C&W, were 
seriously considered. The government was at-
tracted to BT since the company, unlike other 
firms, develops technology and was willing to 
buy C&W’s shares in TEXTEL which would be 
available for another company to purchase as its 
license was due to expire. The government 
deemed it advisable that the same foreign inves-
tor own shares in TELCO and TEXTEL in order 
to facilitate a merger. C&W, in response to the 
‘Information Memorandum’, indicated in its let-
ter, dated 16 February 1988, to Audley Walker, 
then chair of TELCO, its interest and willingness 
to participate in the restructuring of the country’s 
internal and external telecommunications service 
providers. In addition to its familiarity with the 
telecommunications sector, the corporate and 
government culture and political players and 
process in Trinidad and Tobago, C&W placed a 
higher bid than BT for the shares. C&W thus 
succeeded in marketing its services and secured 
the shares in TELCO. 
C&W purchased the 49 percent of TELCO’s 
shares for US$85 million, the first payment of 
US$50 million was made in December 1989 and 
the balance paid in April 1990. At the then pre-
vailing rate of exchange of TT$4.25 to US$1.00, 
the purchase price equaled approximately 
TT$360 million which was far less than TEL-
CO’s TT$900 million investment expenditure. 
Further, TELCO’s loans were rescheduled in 
1989. TSTT acquired TELCO’s debt with the 
merger and was allowed to carry TELCO’s loss-
es in its books, deducting or applying the losses 
against earnings or profits. TSTT also did not 
have to pay corporate taxes until the fiscal year 
1994-5 when the TT$900 million debt was liqui-
dated. It can thus be deemed that C&W did very 
well in terms of its purchase of TELCO. Further, 
in comparison with Jamaica to whom it paid a 
comparable price for the last 40 percent of shares 
in TOJ, C&W acquired a technically superior 
system in Trinidad and Tobago. In this light, the 
investment in Jamaica may appear illogical until 
one considers the telecommunication sharehold-
ings of C&W throughout the region and the con-
sequential control which the company can thus 
exercise. An acquisition cannot be assessed 
strictly on the basis of the individual firm, but 
must be viewed within the context of how this 
piece fits into a larger corporate puzzle. 
Regional holdings of C&W 
The antecedents of C&W, the early telecommu-
nications tentacles of the 19th-century British 
imperial state, are a principal factor for the con-
tinued dominance of C&W in operating tele-
communications systems in former British colo-
nies. C&W has consolidated its corporate strate-
gy by focusing its efforts on areas where the 
company is already entrenched. According to the 
executive chair of C&W (C&W, 1993), Lord 
Young, this approach has resulted in ‘the concept 
of three regional hubs in Asia, Western Europe 
and the Caribbean, creating clusters of businesses 
in order to exploit the benefits of regional mass’. 
C&W presently owns shares of the telecom-
munications systems in 15 Caribbean countries, 
all former British colonies. C&W has acquired 
the image of a local company through hiring lo-
cal staff and directors and by employing ‘nation-
al’ names for the subsidiary companies. The 
names of these ‘national’ telecommunications 
companies, that is Telecommunications of Ja-
maica, Telecommunications Services of Trinidad 
and Tobago, may well be considered misnomers. 
C&W refers to these companies as business units. 
It is also interesting to note how the corporate 
strategy of C&W adjusts to each specific envi-
ronment, as the company advocates competition 
in the UK while staunchly defending its monopo-
ly position in the Caribbean. C&W also owns, 
albeit often in conjunction with other firms, un-
dersea fiber optic cable transmission networks in 
the region as well as satellite earth stations. 
C&W can route traffic in such a way as is most 
profitable to it, not the individual ‘national’ 
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companies. It thereby treats the national compa-
nies in the region as satellite companies, not as 
separate and distinct companies in their own 
right. Further, regulatory provisions in neither 
Jamaica nor Trinidad and Tobago require that 
C&W provide universal service which is based 
on democratic principles. 
Union opposition 
This erosion of the democratic process, of na-
tional sovereignty and economic independence, 
is of great concern to the Communications 
Workers Union (CWU) of Trinidad and Tobago. 
The CWU, which represented both TELCO and 
TEXTEL staff, vehemently objected to the re-
structuring of TELCO’s authorized share capital, 
the conversion of the company’s debt into equity 
and to the subsequent purchase by C&W of 49 
percent of the shares. The CWU, writes Town-
send (1990), was also critical of the merger of 
TELCO and TEXTEL due to the involvement of 
C&W which it considered a recolonization of the 
industry and not representational of the country. 
The CWU was not involved in the negotiations 
nor party to the shareholders’ agreement. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In both Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, di-
vestment of the telecommunications sector was 
principally undertaken through private negotia-
tions with C&W which has historically provided 
telecommunications service to the former British 
colonies of the Caribbean. This continued colo-
nization or neo-colonization of the telecommuni-
cations sector is at odds with the democratic 
structure of the state in Jamaica and Trinidad and 
Tobago. Political parties in both countries 
stressed the importance of public participation in 
the ownership of state-owned enterprises being 
divested; however, the governments failed to ful-
ly enact such measures. 
Although the JLP did make a public share of-
fering of 13 percent of the shares in TOJ and re-
served 2 percent of the shares for an employee 
share scheme, the PNP made no such offerings 
and sold the government’s remaining 40 percent 
of shares to C&W. The private negotiations with 
C&W for these shares were handled by Matalon, 
the chair of the TOJ board, a situation which 
poses an obvious conflict of interest and testifies 
to the power of the elite. Matalon’s influence fur-
ther extends to nepotism in the appointment of 
his son to the TOJ board. This situation is akin to 
that in Trinidad and Tobago where C&W rec-
ommended the current chair of the TSTT board, 
Charles Jacelon, who had previously been hired 
by C&W to advise it in negotiating with the gov-
ernment for the purchase of shares in TELCO. 
Although privatization is recommended in re-
sponse to problems in the public sector, problems 
which include political interference, it would ap-
pear that political considerations continue to 
dominate board appointees, regardless of divest-
ment. Political, not public, considerations have 
governed the entire denationalization process. 
The NAR, which had stipulated in its policy plat-
form that shares in state enterprises to be divest-
ed would be offered to workers and their affiliat-
ed unions and to local capital, utterly disregarded 
the public in the privatization of TELCO. There 
was a complete breakdown in the democratic 
process as the CWU was not consulted and nei-
ther an employee share scheme nor a public of-
fering of shares was made available. 
In both Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago it 
appears that successive administrations misman-
aged the government, as evident in the signifi-
cant accumulation of foreign debt. The inability 
to service external debt obligations was the pri-
mary factor prompting both states to divest the 
telecommunications sector. Divestment is not a 
long-term solution to debt-servicing difficulties. 
To employ this short-sighted approach to what 
are essentially long-term, structural problems 
will not increase the productive capacity of either 
state. The balance of trade deficit will be main-
tained and the future socioeconomic develop-
ment and democratic principles of each state 
jeopardized. Telecommunications divestment in 
both Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago has es-
sentially been an undemocratic process as the 
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public was effectively restricted in its ability to 
participate in the ownership of the firms being 
privatized. In each country, C&W became the 
corporate beneficiary of internal deficiencies. 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
This article is based on a paper presented al the 
International Communications Association con-
ference, Chicago, IL, 27 May 1996. 
FOOTNOTES 
1. JAMINTEL was formed as a limited liability 
company in January 1971 with an ownership 
structure in which the Jamaican government held 
51 percent of the issued capital and C&W 49 
percent. The company, which provided telex, tel-
egram and facsimile services, data access and 
leased circuits, was originally created with the 
understanding that the government could use the 
profits to buy out C&W. The profits, however, 
were not employed by the government to pur-
chase the shares and over time the value of the 
company increased to the point that the govern-
ment could not afford the shares. 
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